This paper presents an architecture (Multi-u) being implemented to study and develop software based fault tolerant mechanisms for Real-Time Systems, using the Ada language (Ada 95) and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components. Several issues regarding fault tolerance are presented and mechanisms to achieve fault tolerance by software active replication in Ada 95 are discussed. The Multi-p architecture, based on a specifically proposed Fault Tolerance Manager (FTManager), is then described. Finally, some considerations are made about the work being done and essential future developments.
INTRODUCTION
Dependability is an important topic in real-time systems supporting industrial applications, since reliability and availability are important issues for these applications. One Permission to make digital or hard copies 01 all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed ior profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. SlGAda '98 11198 Washington. D.C.. USA 0 1999 ACM 1. 58113 of the means to achieve dependability is fault tolerance, i. e., how to provide a service complying with the specification even in the presence of faults. In real-time applications, unexpected failures of the system are not acceptable, since value or timing requirements would not be met, consequently leading to money and/or human losses. It is clear that a real-time system must provide mechanisms to tolerate faults, in order to respect its requirements. Optionally it can gracefully degrade its behaviour into a safe-state, guaranteeing that a task subset still respects its requirements. A usual approach to achieve fault tolerance is by distributing the system elements, i. e. by means of structural redundancy. However there is a difference between distribution motivated fault tolerance (implementing fault tolerance in a distributed environment) and fault tolerance motivated distribution (implementing distribution to achieve fault tolerance) [ll] . The latter has different requirements and the system specification must be made considering fault tolerance assumptions. The proposed architecture (Multi+) targets applications where fault tolerance is an important issue, mainly due to availability and reliability requirements and not due to safety requirements. It is implemented through the active replication of processing nodes, based on the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. Fault tolerance is achieved by means of a specially proposed software architecture, based on a layer between the application and the real-time kernel, responsible for the fault tolerance management. This paper starts discussing some generic issues related to software based architectures for fault tolerant systems, namely concerning the active replication requirements. Afterwards, current work on Ada (horn now on Ada will be used to refer the 95 standard) support for fault tolerant systems is presented and discussed. Finally, the Multi-p architecture is presented and a Fault Tolerance Manager, twhich implements the fault tolerance mechanisms in Ada, is discussed. Then, some conclusions are drawn, and Pf esent and future work is described. 53 3. ACHIEVING
FAULT TOLERANCE BY SOFTWARE ACTIVE REPLICATION
Fault tolerance techniques must be used accordingly with failure mode assumptions, so identification of which are the faults that must be tolerated by the system is of most importance for the system specification. From the Laprie [9] classification of faults, we can identify those that must be tolerated by the system:
. internal physical faults (permanent and temporary); . temporary external physical faults; .
design faults (permanent and temporary).
Temporary external physical faults must be addressed but these can be avoided with appropriate filtering and shielding of the system. They will not be considered in the development of the software architecture.
Internal physical faults are addressed through the component replication. Permanent design faults must be tolerated and this means that there must be a way to allow for design diversity. Temporary design faults are a strange concept, but they can be tolerated because of the differences in the replicas execution environment [ll], as they were temporary internal physical faults.
The mechanisms that support fault tolerance are usually implemented by replication: temporal replication, redoing the calculations; or structural replication, replicating physical (and/or logical) resources. In a real-time system, as the time resource is scarce, structural replication is the preferred one.
Replication management can be achieved using special&d hardware, which consequently increases the overall cost of the system. Another problem with hardware replication management is that as hardware evolves, specialised hardware must be re-designed. Conversely, the software-based replication allows the use of off-the-shelf hardware, decreasing the cost of the system, and at the same time increasing its portability and upgradability.
COTS components can be assumed to be fail-silent or fail-uncontrolled [ 111. A fail-silent component is one that only fails by crashing while fail-uncontrolled means a component that can fail in an arbitrary mode. The assumption of fail-silent components simplifies the fault tolerance mechanisms implementation, since failures can be detected just by time-out mechanisms. However using COTS components, achieving fail-silent behaviour is only possible with the use of self-checking techniques, increasing the system cost and complexity. SO, fault tolerant mechanisms must also address the components with fail-uncontrolled behaviour.
Two main replication approaches are addressed in the literature [3] : active replication and primary-backup (passive) replication. In active replication, all replicas process the same inputs, keeping their internal state synchronised and voting all on the same outputs. In the primary-backup approach only one replica (the primary) is responsible for the inputs processing, being the replicas kept up to date by the primary, to take-over in case of its failure.
Using the primary-backup approach, backup replicas can only detect the primary failure through the absence of service delivery, not being able to reason about the service correctness. This approach can be used only if we assume fail-silent replicas. Otherwise, in the absence of the fail-silent assumption, wrong service delivery can only be detected by active replication. As a consequence, in the absence of the fail-silent approach active replication is the most adequate technique [lo] .
The use of COTS implies generally fail-uncontrolled replicas, so it becomes necessary the use of active replication techniques. This approach implies, usually, the need of replica determinism, otherwise the overhead due to replica synchronisation may largely increase.
The group abstraction can be used to implement a framework for the replica management [3] . Two problems are identified [2]: consensus, where there must be a decision despite the presence of failures, and membership, where there must be an agreement on who belongs to the group. Active replication can be implemented using static groups, simplifying the necessary techniques. There is no need to consider the case of leaving or joining the group (membership), but there is still the need of agreement between the processes in the group (consensus).
Even assuming replica determinism (replicas being state machines [13] ) there are some mechanisms that must be implemented to support consensus between replicas. They must guarantee that all replicas work with the same input values and that they all vote on the final output. Three problems are identified:
. achieving interactive consistency on replicated sensor data; .
achieving Byzantine agreement on single-source data; .
achieving consensus on output values.
With replica non-determinism there is still a remaining problem:
. the need of replica synchronisation in every point that can lead to execution divergence.
From a real-time system perspective, fault tolerance can be defined as the ability of a system to deliver the expected service in a timely manner, even in the presence of faults [5] . An important issue in real-time systems is that such fault tolerance mechanisms must be time bounded, in order to achieve timing predictability.
ADA SUPPORT FOR FAULT TOLERANT SYSTEMS
application as a whole. It is not intended for distributed systems, but it distributes the system to achieve fault tolerance. The Ada language doesn't provide direct support for fault tolerance mechanisms, apart from the exception mechanism, which can provide forward error recovery. However, exceptions can't provide tolerance to anticipated faults, or to design faults [6] . The solution is to burden the application programmer by explicit programming fault tolerance mechanisms. Work has (and is) being done in the integration of fault tolerance and Ada. Two approaches coexist: incorporating explicit programmer support for fault tolerance mechanisms, or providing transparent support for software replication. Kermarrec et al present their implementation of recovery blocks (providing backward error recovery) in GNAT [6] and recovery blocks for distributed fault tolerance using their implementation of the Ada Distributed Systems Annex, GLADE [7] . Their approach is to provide compiler extensions through a prugma, so as the programmer can explicitly use recovery blocks in the application to build a fault tolerant system. Wellings and Bums [15] evaluate Ada capabilities to support fault tolerant applications. They use those capabilities to program Atomic Actions, which can be used to build fault tolerant applications. Later [l], they discuss replication, either active or passive, on the Distributed Systems Annex of Ada, providing replication mechanisms, which must be explicitly used by the application programmer. Wolf [16] presents some issues regarding replica implementation within the partition model of Ada Distributed Systems Annex. He initially assumes replica determinism, but then extends the discussion to non-deterministic replicas. 'Ibis approach is based on extending the run-time support to implement transparent replication of partitions. However, this approach is intended for fail-silent components, not being appropriate for COTS components (as discussed in the previous section). ReplicAda [4] presents ZUl0tl.M fault tolerant implementation using Ada Distributed Systems Annex. It is based on a layer under the Partition Communication Subsystem that presents a transparent view to the programmer, hiding all the replication issues. This approach assumes replica determinism, mainly through programmer supported use of Ada mechanisms (like pragma Restrictions). The replication work being done in Ada is for fault tolerance in distributed systems (distribution motivated fault tolerance), where the goal is to replicate application partitions. Conversely, the architecture here presented doesn't pretend to replicate application partitions, but the The active replication model to achieve fault tolerance can be implemented in Ada either imposing replica determinism or keeping replica consistency at critical points, by means of consensus mechanisms. However, guaranteeing deterministic replicas imposes several restrictions on the application programmer, excluding constructs that may cause non-deterministic replicas evolution. As each node has different execution environments, interleaving tasks, calls to protected objects or time dependencies may cause divergence between replicas.
Considering a tightly-coupled architecture, based on hardware buses like VME or PCI, the communication overheads are small and time bounded. The necessary consensus algorithms can be efficiently implemented, and their use can be made transparent to the application programmer. This approach hides the fault tolerance A transparent approach to fault tolerance must provide consensus in every replica's point that can lead to mechanisms from the application programmer, not non-deterministic behaviour. However, it simplifies the application programmer burden, if the fault tolerance imposing replica determinism. manager can transparently implement such points. Mechanisms like recovery blocks [6] [7] and atomic actions [15] , which must be explicitly supported by the application, are not appropriated in a fault tolerant transparent approach.
MULTI-p ARCHITECTURE
The Multi-p architecture targets the development of fault tolerance mechanisms for systems where reliability and availability are of most importance, and where safety is not addressed (non-critical systems). It is intended to implement a fault tolerant architecture capable of being expanded to cope with an increasing number of faults. It implements this approach by node replication with software based replica management, and fault tolerance transparent algorithms. Its architecture (figure 1) is based on replicated software components on top of replicated nodes, which are built with both COTS kernel and hardware. The fault tolerance mechanisms are implemented below the application, interacting with the real-time kernel. Being a tightlycoupled system it can be implemented using hardware buses like VME or PCI, and thus implementing a synchronous distributed system. The advantage of a synchronous system is that communication times are bounded, simplifying algorithms to implement fault tolerance mechanisms.
intended.
To support consensus between replicas, communication mechanisms must be provided to support the dissemination of replica private values. The implemented fault tolerant communication algorithm is the Signed Messages (SM(m)) algorithm of Lamport, Shostak and Pease [8] . A node pretending to disseminate its private value signs and broadcasts it to all other nodes. Each node, when receiving another node's value, co-signs it and sends it to all other nodes. When receiving a value that is already cc+signed by a set of nodes it also co-signs it and sends the value to the nodes not yet present in the set. When a node knows that it will not receive any more messages it finally selects and delivers the correct value.
As the system does not assume malicious replicas, checksums can be used to provide the required authentication.
With this algorithm each node may know another node's private value, even in the presence of, at the most, m faults (considering that at least m+2 nodes are being used) [8].
Communication Manager
The Communication Manager supports the needed communication abstractions in order to solve the earlier presented problems. As the system is tightly-coupled, communication algorithms can be made very efficient, thus simplifying the replica management mechanisms.
I Rtems-Interface. Queues package
The Communication Manager is built on top of a thin Ada binding to RTEMS queues. This interface (package Rtems-Interface.Queues) provides a mechanism to exchange messages between nodes, without any knowledge of its content. ___~~---------------____________________~ 
Rtems-Interface Id: unsigned32; end record; end Rtems-Interface.Queues;
Group-Communication package
The Group-Communication package provides group abstraction to the higher layers, and also logical links between nodes, on top of the Rtems-InterfaceQueues package. It is a generic package that can be instantiated within each particular application. Its parameters are the number of nodes in the system, the number of groups in each node, the maximum number of messages that can be received by a group, and the maximum size of data that can be exchanged. The communication between replicas is implemented using two unidirectional queues (send and receive queues) between each pair of nodes, providing full logical connectivity. We envisage the use of queue redundancy in order to cope with queue failures, providing redundant paths between each pair of nodes. The Send-Queue is implemented using a protected type, giving exclusive access to the Send procedure. The Receive-Queue is implemented using a task type, which is blocked on the queue, waiting to receive, and re-routing the message to the appropriated group.
Groups are implemented using a protected type (Send, Received and Broadcast procedures), with only one entry (Receive) where a task waiting on a message can be blocked. type Access-Group is access Group;
InitializecNode: Node-Id); procedure Join-Group( Id: Group-Id; Grp: out Access-Group); . It is a generic package, which can be instantiated for each data type that must be exchanged between the replicas. The only restriction is that the data type must have a defined assignment and equality, and it must be a definite type so that uninitialised objects can be declared.
Two procedures are implemented. Procedure Provide sends data to every other node on the system. Procedure Agree-On is used to agree on data replicated across the system, provided by any set of nodes.
Ada.Real-Time; UB(I Ada.Real-Time; generic type Value-Type ie private; --Assignement and Equality --must be defined for Value-Type --and it must be definite
Provide( Grp: Access-Group; Data:
Value-Type);
procedure Agree-On( Data:
in out Data-Type; Grp: Access-Group; Nodes:
Source-Nodes; Timeout: Time);
end Group-Communication.SM-Algorithm;
Replica Manager
Without assuming replica determinism, there is the need to explicitly synchronise the different replicas. The Replica Manager, besides hiding the communication algorithms horn the application, must also cope with the nondeterministic behaviour of the replicas.
In an Ada application some problems can be identified that may cause divergence between replicas:
. Synchronous communication between tasks (Rendezvous). When there are several client tasks that can make a call on a server task entry, different interleaving may cause divergence; .
Asynchronous communication. When two tasks communicate asynchronously using protected objects, their different interleaving can cause different replica behaviour, such as, in one replica the reader executing after the writer, while in some other these operations may be executed in the opposite order; .
Use of the Select construct can have different results depending on the different interleaving of tasks (it is not surprisingly that Ada Select construct is often referred when there is the need for an example of any non-deterministic language construct).
To prevent these problems, the Replica Manager must synchronise the replicas behaviour. It does so by delaying a request until all nodes make the same request.
As protected objects are passive entities, when they need to synchronise accesses, a monitor task is created to receive the synchronisation requests in the same way as for replicated tasks.
The configuration of the application is made through the introduction of prugmus in the application code. Tools can be used to automate that job. As not all tasks need to be synchronised, off-line scheduling analysis can be used to detect precedence constraints between them, which can be captured by the scheduler.
In order to configure the application, three prugmus will be used:
. prugmu Replicated, to identify the tasks and protected objects that must have replication management;
. prugmu Synchronise, to identify the places in the code where there is the need for replica synchronisation;
m prugmu Agreement, to identify where there is the need for agreement on replicated (or single-source) values;
The Replica Manager is, at the moment, under development.
APPLICATION EXAMPLE
To introduce some of Ada non-determinism problems, and to show how referred prugmus may be used, an application example is used. In this example, two client tasks read some device data, make requests to a single server task ensuring that it is ready for data processing, sending data to the server through a protected object. The server task then reads the data and processes it.
The protected object Buffer procedures Write and Read can be called from different tasks. As already stated, system replication can induce non-deterministic access to objects.
The prugmu Replicated applied to the object implies that there must be a monitor task to prevent it. Tasks Server, ClientA and ClientB are replicated among the system. The pragma Replicated is used to achieve the needed consensus.
Task Server uses a Select statement to accept calls on two different entries. Thepragma Synchronise is used to state the need of synchronisation between that task group, in which call is accepted. Every time that a task makes a call on a protected object, or on a server task entry, the need for synchronisation arises, so the pragma Synchronise is used.
The necessary agreement on Input and Output is provided by pragma Agreement, when tasks read device data --Server task, with two entries, --use of select, and read access to the --protected object --By stating that the Task is replicated --it will implement a group so to --achieve consensous between replicas ----------------------------------------- ------__-----------------------------------Client task, calling two entries, --write access to the protected object, --and providing sigle-source values ----------------------------------------pragma Replicated; The proposed architecture targets applications where fault tolerance is an important issue, mainly due to availability and reliability requirements and not due to safety requirements. It is implemented through the active replication of processing nodes, with fault tolerance being achieved by means of a specially proposed software layer, the Fault Tolerance Manager (FlManager). The proposed FTManager is based on a Communication Manager, which is responsible for the implementation of a Group Communication framework, and a Replica Manager, which provides the necessary mechanisms for replica management, hiding its implementation from the application programmer.
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